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Solon’S EkStatic StratEgy
StaSiS and thE SubjEct/citizEn
hegel famously argues that the ancient Greeks did not have 
a notion of the subject because they lacked a conception of self- 
consciousness. There is, nonetheless, something enticing in Hegel’s 
notion of the Greek subject as lacking self- consciousness by Hegel. In 
particular, the lack of a reliance on reflection for the determination 
of human agency is intimately linked to, even inextricable from, the 
conception of the citizen. What the ancient Greek “subject” may lack 
in self- reflexivity, thereby never arriving at the idea of transcendental 
subjectivity, it compensates for with a decisively political insistence 
on human action and thought.
The connection between the subject and the citizen is important 
because, as Étienne Balibar has shown in a series of texts, starting with 
“Citizen Subject,” the two concepts are actually linked in modernity, 
both in terms of their genealogy and in terms of the political commit-
ments they entail.1 In the context of trying to answer the question 
“What comes after the subject?” it may, then, be useful to remember 
the historical specificity and artificiality, even artifice, of the wrench-
ing apart of the subject and the citizen. It may even lead us to wonder 
whether the separation between subject and citizen is tenable, espe-
cially when we note the ways in which violence is inscribed in affect-
ing this separation. To raise these questions, then, the Greek subject’s 
lack of “self- consciousness” is indeed a fruitful starting point. I pro-
pose to do so by organizing some thoughts about the subject depart-
ing from the Greeks.
Perhaps the greatest examples of a conjoining of the subject and the 
citizen in Greek context appear in the tragedies. But I would like here 
to focus on a different example that is arguably of equal importance 
and no less dramatic. I am thinking of Solon’s law against neutrality, 
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or, as I prefer to call it, the law of stasis. I cite it here in full as it appears 
in Aristotle’s Athenian Constitution:
And as he saw that the state was often in conflict [στασιάζουσαν], while 
some citizens would let things take their course through idleness [διὰ 
τὴν ῥᾳθυμίαν], he laid down a special law to deal with them, enacting 
that whoever did not take a stand in a stasis [στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως] 
was to lose his citizenship and to be expelled from the polis. (8.5, transla-
tion modified)2
We should remember that, according to the tradition, Solon’s is the 
first- ever democratic constitution. This peculiar law stands out in the 
Solonian code as conjoining the way that one is in the world with 
the conditions for citizenship. If one’s being in the world precludes 
political participation, that is, if a subject refuses to engage in the con-
flict of stasis that is constitutive of being a citizen, then the subject will 
be stripped of its formal citizenship and expelled from the polis.
Note that the Solonian conception of the democratic subject/citi-
zen is described almost in the dramatic terms. The democratic polis 
is like a stage. The conflict or stasis between the parties takes place 
on this stage. The actors are subject/citizens occupying the polis as a 
stage of the drama. Simultaneously, there is an actor on the side of the 
stage, lounging about and refraining from moving to center stage. The 
law of stasis indicates the imperative for the actor to position him or 
herself at that part of the stage where the stasis unfolds. There is no 
drama without the agon that unfolds on the stage.3 In this conception, 
democracy is the participation by the subject in the agon unfolding on 
the political stage.
Now, such a drama does not conform to the usual way in which 
we understand democracy. If an off- the- shelf definition of democracy 
is required, then one usually refers to the two proper names of the 
compound word: democracy indicates that the people (demos) hold 
power or rule (kratos). I do not need to belabor the well- rehearsed dif-
ficulties of this “self- evident” definition of democracy. I can mention 
indicatively questions such as the following: Is the demos in ancient 
Athens really the same as the people in modernity? Does the “direct” 
democracy of Athens have any bearing on the representative democ-
racy prevalent today? Are those who, for whatever de facto reason, 
excluded from participation, no longer part of the demos? And so on. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be an extraordinary consensus about the 
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importance for the definition of democracy as the people (however 
they are determined) being in a position to rule. In other words, there 
is a double assumption in how we automatically come to understand 
that compound word “democracy.” First, the privileged term is demos. 
And, second, kratos refers to constituted power.
The scene described by the law of stasis does not abide by these 
assumptions. The actors do not form a ruling people— if any notion 
of the people is implicated here, it is one of unruly opponents who 
engage in fighting and disagreements. Even more important, it seems 
that Solon’s law of stasis profoundly disturbs the double assumption 
I outlined above. First, the emphasis shifts to kratos. Second, kratos here 
indicates the unfolding of a conflict in which someone must prevail— it 
is not about constituted power but about overpowering. Nicole Loraux, 
in her seminal work, The Divided City, has paid close attention to this 
meaning of kratos for an understanding of democracy as well as the 
political.
A lot of my work is also based on the double assumption in Solon’s 
law of stasis.4 What I call agonistic democracy departs precisely from 
this double assumption— shifting the emphasis to kratos while simul-
taneously understanding kratos as conflict. Such an assumption poses 
a significant difficulty, or a problematic. Let me outline it with recourse 
to the theatrical scene of Solon’s law of stasis.
The shift from the meaning of democracy as the people- rule to 
that of the affirmation of an inherent conflict or opposition is possible 
only if we can distinguish between the two meanings of kratos. Dif- 
ferently put, such an understanding of agonistic democracy will only 
be possible if we can draw a distinction between constituted power and 
the conflictual element that sustains the definition of the subject as citi-
zen. Further, to draw this distinction, we need to answer at least two 
questions: What are the qualitative differences in the violence implied 
in the two senses of kratos? And how are these two different senses of 
violence related to each other? I will tackle these questions and their 
implications for a conception of the subject by examining the drama 
of Solon’s law of stasis. Each question will be described as an Act in 
the drama of the law of stasis.
Before doing so, a clarification is necessary. What I call agonis- 
tic democracy— shifting the emphasis to kratos, and also distinguish-
ing this sense of kratos from senses of rule and constituted power— is 
CC #96.indd   73 09/08/2017   9:58:45 PM
74 DIMITRIS VARDOULAKIS
indebted to a series of thinkers of agonistic democracy such as Bonnie 
Honig, Chantal Mouffe, and James Tully. And yet there is one impor-
tant difference. What characterizes all these accounts— their many 
differences notwithstanding— is a commitment to reading agonistic 
democracy in conjunction with sovereignty. Agonistic democracy, in 
these construals, either supplements, or complements, or checks sov-
ereignty. Conversely, my definition of agonistic democracy is based on 
a different assumption, which is, to repeat, a distinction between kra-
tos as rule or sovereignty, on the one hand, and kratos as conflict or 
stasis, on the other. Agonistic democracy, as I designate it, distinguishes 
between sovereignty and democracy, and inquires about their relation.
aCt i: exiLe, death, and a Shot Behind the BaCk
How does the drama unfold in this scene of stasis presented by Solon’s 
law? A first Act concerns the citizen who has been expelled. Our 
“slacker” hero places himself in a particular relation to the commu- 
nity that is an affront to the way that the community forms itself. His 
slackness contradicts participation. It is important that slackness is not 
a characteristic that can be separated from the experience of relating 
to the community. It does not refer to something that is independent 
of the situation. Rather, both slackness and participation are attitudes 
that one can practice in their own singular way and given their own 
singular circumstances. They do not refer to an essential feature of the 
person; they are rather a predicate of the person’s engagement with 
others. It is significant to note, then, that there is an important differ-
ence between the citizen conceived as a singular person, as opposed 
to being an individual. Singularity entails a praxis thereby referring to 
the other, to the fellow citizens. Conversely, the individual in Greek is 
referred to as idios, or idiotes, which means a private person. Given that 
these substantives provide the root for the word “idiot,” the pejorative 
sense in idios and idiotes is unmistakable. An “idiot” is one who does 
not take account of the other.
The distinction between the singularity of the engaged subject 
and the individual leads to a further distinction about violence, which 
is crucial for this static scene. Being banished and losing his citizen-
ship, our hero suffers from a kind of violence exercised. This violence 
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can be understood in two, significantly different ways. First, it can be 
a violence that dislocates the person. It can be a violence that exiles 
the citizen and that positions the person as an idiotes, as someone whose 
essential characteristic is to be preoccupied by his private interest. Dif-
ferently put, this is a violence that denies its victim singularity. It exer-
cises itself by assigning an attribute— it ascribes a value— to its victim. 
Such violence ultimately supports the power (kratos) of those who 
rule. A second kind of violence can be interpreted as simply denying 
citizenship based on the worth of the individual. This is much closer 
to the Athenian conception, given that Athenian citizenship is based 
on the worth of one’s actions.5 “Worth” here is not to be understood 
as a moral value, nor is it associated with a discourse of exceptional-
ism.6 Rather, worth denotes the way that participation articulates itself 
in action. In other words, it is a violence that allows for the unfolding 
of stasis or for the unfolding of kratos as conflict. Here, singularity is 
retained.
The distinctions between the two ways of conceiving subjectivity 
and violence are intimately connected. The first violence performs a 
kind of murder; it is a death of the citizen, in the sense that the value 
attributed to the citizen circumscribes his actions in advance. Con-
versely, the second kind of violence is remedial. The banished hero 
retains the potential to act in such a way as to participate in a worthy 
manner, and hence as to be permitted to return to the city. Act I, then, 
is about the choice between these two possibilities: violence or stasis. 
It forges a distinction between the actions of a subject that opposes 
participation and the actions of a subject that produce an agonistic 
sense of democratic participation.
* * *
Is it possible to transfer this Act of the ancient drama to a modern 
setting? To do so, we need to consider the modern subject. There are 
numerous well- known conceptions of the subject in modernity. We 
can identify the subject, following Hegel, with the creation of the self- 
reflexive individual and hence with the creation of a space of rea- 
son wherein the public sphere operates.7 Or, in Heidegger’s manner, 
we can locate the subject as an onto- theological remnant whose meta-
physical heritage needs to be destroyed.8 Althusser recognizes that 
the subject is the center of interpolation and hence of the formation of 
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ideology.9 For Hannah Arendt, the subject remains crucial for the pos-
sibility of overcoming the instrumentalism of violence and affirming 
the human capacity to create something new.10 Agamben insists that 
the subject is riven between a purely physical body and a political 
body, which produces sovereign power.11 And so on— this list can eas-
ily be extended. The common denominator of all these perspectives— 
their huge differences notwithstanding— is that the determination of 
the subject always entails the political. The “political” here does not 
signify simply formal or institutional organizations such as govern-
ments and political parties; rather, the “political” in the broadest sense 
refers to how people relate to each other— be it reflexively, or in terms 
of a fundamental ontology of the Dasein, through ideology or through 
vita activa, or simply by being subjected to the various biopolitical 
mechanisms. The subject is never a subject. The subject exists as a plu-
rality. There is a subject so long as there are others around it.
Given that the modern subject is inherently related to others, just 
like the ancient citizen, we can say, using the vocabulary from Solon, 
that participation is an inherent possibility of the subject. The modern 
subject can and must participate with others in order to be a subject. 
From this perspective, the disfranchised citizen appears as the death 
of the subject. Both are confronted by a violence that puts them as well 
as their community in peril. The drama, then, asks: What comes after 
this threat is realized? Or, differently put, what comes after the sub-
ject? Viewed from this perspective, there are two ways of approaching 
the question about what comes after the subject, depending on how 
we understand the “after.”12
The first determination of the “after” consists in understanding 
it in a temporal manner. What is it that succeeds the subject? What 
emerges in its place when the subject is no longer operative? This 
approach assumes that the subject is an individual clearly separable 
from other individuals. The individual is in control of its own mental 
and affective processes that unfold in temporal succession. Such an 
individual would always need to be reconnected to the community 
of other subjects. For instance, Kant argues that every individual is 
dependent upon a realm of morality— the “kingdom of ends,” as Kant 
calls it in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 2002). The 
moral realm, which is common to every human being at all places and 
throughout time, is ultimately responsible for the bonds of society, as 
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Kant shows in “The Doctrine of Right” (Kant 1996). The combination 
of the epistemic independence of the subject and its dependence on a 
transcendent morality define the Kantian subject as autonomous. This 
approach disavows in advance the political import of the subject’s exis-
tence. The individual as it exists in a temporal continuum, within which 
it can control its thoughts and emotions, is ab initio isolated and it can 
only come into a community through something such as a “kingdom 
of ends” that is always beyond existence, since it transcends spatio-
temporal determinations. In other words, the political is provided with 
a basis that is beyond experience and which disavows the singularity 
of the individual.
The so- called death of the subject and similar expressions usually 
refer to this conception of the subject in modern thought.13 They express 
the dissatisfaction that is a consequence of the problems that follow 
from the separation of the subject’s existence from the basis of the 
political. All the essays collected in Who Comes After the Subject?— the 
predecessor of this collection of essays— express this dissatisfaction 
in one way or another.14 But after taking this dissatisfaction with the 
subject as individual seriously, then the question does indeed arise: 
“What does come after the subject?” This arises from the recognition 
that if we could go past the subject— however that subject is con- 
ceived— where would that leave the others who are a constitutive part 
of every subject? The death of the subject threatens the elimination 
of the other as a necessary accompaniment to each individual subject. 
The desire to “kill” the individual subject because it disavows singular-
ity threatens inadvertently the other who is of necessity a constitutive 
part of the subject. In other words, to say that something comes after 
the subject would point to a space past or beyond the political inter-
relations that exist between a subject and those around it. The death 
of the subject is the dearth of the political. The death of the subject, 
then, recalls the first kind of violence that was exercised, according 
to our reading of Solon’s special law: in both cases, violence is exer-
cised on an individual in such a way as to eliminate its community. 
Thus, the “after” in its first construal actually signifies a violent ges-
ture that eliminates not only a single individual but also all the indi-
viduals around it. From this perspective, the death of the subject does 
not merely exhibit a desire to overcome a specifically modern concep-
tion of subjectivity, but also a deeper death drive— a predilection to 
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thanatopolitics. Given that such a death drive articulates itself in oppo-
sition to participation, it is also a drive against the agonistic sense of 
democracy. Instead, it works always in the service of, or in order to 
justify, the rule of constituted power (of kratos as sovereignty).15
The second way consists in understanding the “after” in rela-
tional terms. The question, then, is not one of superseding the subject, 
or even simply about what is implied alongside the subject. Rather, it 
consists in asking how the relations of the subject to others unfold. 
Differently put, it consists in the recognition that the subject is never 
one but always plural. Consequently, such a recognition insists on 
the relations between the subject and its other(s). The question of the 
subject is both an ontological and a political question— or, it is simul-
taneously ontological and political. From the moment that the subject 
is defined in a political manner, it finds itself in relation. A subject is 
always with others, whose presence, moreover, undermines the clear 
borders that demarcate one subject as a distinct individual in space 
and time. The subject is always plural. Or, stated from an ontological 
perspective, there is never being as such; rather, being is always being 
with. Such a relational ontology of the subject entails that the other is 
always “after” the individual, an other always follows the subject like 
a double.16
We should not forget the romantic and gothic plot according to 
which the double is inherently threatening. With this in mind, the 
question of violence again returns. The presence of others both enables 
the construction of a notion of the subject, and yet at the same time 
it challenges it.17 The idea of a universal neighborly love that elimi-
nates enmity is an illusion because, as Freud ponders, what if the 
other wants to kill me?18 It is important to recognize that this threat is 
not self- evidently negative; rather, it is constitutive of intersubjective 
relations. There is a distinction as to how violence is constructed. If 
the presence of the other is understood as being part of the stasis that 
makes participation possible, then the threat of the other can func- 
tion in a positive way. The other is the co- participant in the conflicts 
that make community possible. This is not to deny the reality of the 
treat. Rather, the threat is the necessary risk for an agonistic democ-
racy based on stasis. We cannot have stasis without that inherent 
threat. The violence then described in this second sense of the “after” 
is like the effects of stasis that we saw in Solon’s special law. It denotes 
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the second sense of kratos as conflict— which, as I indicated earlier, 
is one of the constitutive characteristics of agonistic democracy as I 
define it.
We have arrived, then, at a distinction in this scene: whereas the 
death of the subject denotes a thanatopolitics that puts the subject no 
less than its community in peril while simultaneously asserting sov-
ereign power, stasis is the condition of the possibility of the ontologico- 
political constitution of the subject as being with and hence the 
condition of the possibility of agonistic democracy. The drama about 
the actor in Solon’s law of stasis unfolds around this distinction.
* * *
Can we discover a modern instance of Act I of this drama that stages 
the stark alternative between violence and stasis? For this, we need to 
turn to Walter Benjamin. The reason is not only that his own notion 
of a dialectics at a standstill resonates with stasis— we will return to 
this point later. In addition, Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Its Technological Reproducibility” can be read as a meditation on 
the subject. A major insight of the “Work of Art” essay is that experi-
ence and technology, the subject’s being and the instruments or means 
that are part of its being, are interconnected.19 The fact that one is and 
the way that one is can never be separated. Differently put, and recall-
ing the vocabulary from the Solonian law, the subject exists so long 
as it participates in the world using the means at its disposal. Benja-
min calls these means “technology.” Technology is intimately linked 
to sociality.
The link between the subject, technology, and sociality is best artic-
ulated through the figure of the film actor.20 Benjamin describes how 
the film actor’s performance is like a test in the sense that the film actor 
performs in front of the apparatus. There is a similarity between a film 
actor and an athlete, Benjamin notes, which is not simply that they are 
both performing a test— that is also the case for a worker operating 
a machine in a factory. Rather, the similarity between the film actor 
and the athlete consists in that their test performances “are capable of 
being publically exhibited” (Benjamin 2002, 111). But their difference 
is also telling: whereas the athlete “measures himself against tasks 
set by nature,” the measure of the film actor’s test is his performance 
in relation to the filming apparatuses: “Film makes test performances 
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capable of being exhibited, by turning that ability itself into a test” 
(Benjamin 2002, 111). The exhibition of the performance enables the 
film actor’s participation in the community. The film actor then becomes 
paradigmatic of the modern subject in the sense that technological 
means at his disposal make possible the way that his actions relate to 
others— the way that he participates in the community. Technology 
signifies for Benjamin the being with of the subject.
The link between technology and the subject leads to the critique 
of the autonomous individual.21 Benjamin carries out this critique 
through a comparison between the stage actor and the film actor. It 
starts with the following distinction: “The actor represents someone 
else before the audience . . . [whereas] he represents himself before 
the apparatus” (Benjamin 2002, 112). The test performance that takes 
place in the actor’s relating to the apparatus is part of the singular 
experience that unfolds in the now. This recalls the insistence by Solon 
to participate in the agon that characterizes the polis. The theme of 
exile is also present in Benjamin, who cites Pirandello’s observation 
that the “film actor feels . . . as if exiled.” But if the Athenian citizen 
was exiled from the city for not participating, from where is the film 
actor exiled? The citation from Pirandello continues: “Exiled not from 
the stage but from his own person” (ibid.). The film actor is exiled 
from his own person in the sense of being exiled from that notion of 
the modern subject whose autonomy presupposes a consistent iden-
tity with clear spatiotemporal limits. The reason is that these limits are 
assailed by the apparatus that functions like a prosthesis to the being 
of the film actor. His being, acting, and participation unfold in intimate 
relation to these ancillary instruments. The film actor is Benjamin’s 
figuration of the subject whose being is with others through the medi-
ation of technological means.
It is at this point, after the assertion of the inherent sociality that 
technology grants the subject, that the dramatic choice between sov-
ereign violence and stasis takes center stage. Benjamin imagines a film 
actor asked to feign surprise in front of the camera, but whose per- 
formance does not satisfy the director. In that case, Benjamin asserts, 
“The director can resort to an expedient: he could have a shot fired 
without warning behind the actor’s back on some other occasion when 
he happened to be in the studio. The actor’s frightened reaction at that 
moment could be recorded and then edited into the film” (Benjamin 
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2002, 113). The technical aspect of recording the actor’s startled response 
recalls Jean- Luc Godard, who makes a virtue of challenging the actor 
in similar ways.22 But the technical aspect is not an end in itself in 
Benjamin’s essay. Rather, it is always linked to the way that technol-
ogy provides the means for the subject to relate to others. Unlike the 
Athenian citizen in Solon’s law who does not participate at all, here 
the film actor fails to participate in an adequate manner. His acting 
is wanting. The gun shot behind the back of the unsuspecting actor 
becomes a further instrument in assisting with participation. Instead 
of the actual threat of violence— the threat to kill the subject— the gun 
here is an ancillary that remedies the actor’s deficient performance, 
thereby facilitating his participation with others.
Benjamin’s figure of the film actor takes sides in the dramatic 
choice between sovereign violence and stasis of Act I. The film actor 
indicates a participation that leads to commonality. The shot fired is 
not aimed at killing the actor, but rather at enabling his participat- 
ing. Benjamin emphasizes this engagement with others immediately 
after the “case” of the gun shot behind the back: “The representation 
of human beings by means of an apparatus has made possible a highly 
productive use of the human being’s self- alienation. The nature of this 
use can be grasped through the fact that the film actor’s estrange- 
ment in the face of the apparatus . . . is basically of the same kind 
as the estrangement felt before one’s appearance in a mirror— a favor-
ite theme of the Romantics” (Benjamin 2002, 113). In other words, to 
recall Pirandello, the actor is exiled from that notion of subjectivity 
that requires a distinct individual in space and time— just like the 
Kantian subject that was criticized by the Romantics. But Benjamin is 
not content with the Romantic solution that delighted in the mise en 
abyme of infinite reflection. Instead, technology facilitates participa-
tion with the others. Benjamin continues: “But now the mirror image 
has become detachable from the person mirrored, and is transport-
able. And where is it transported? To a site in front of the masses. . . . 
When he [the screen actor] stands in front of the apparatus, he knows 
that in the end he is confronting the masses. It is they who will control 
him” (ibid.). The shot has not killed a subject. Instead, the shot facili-
tates contact with others. The shot shows that the subject is not auton-
omous, but rather controlled by the other(s). The film actor’s being is 
a being with.
CC #96.indd   81 09/08/2017   9:58:46 PM
82 DIMITRIS VARDOULAKIS
aCt ii: the CUnning of WeakneSS
The choice between violence and stasis in Act I seems to resolve itself 
in favor of stasis. And yet, there is a dramatic twist, according to which 
the thanatopolitics of violence emerges as victorious the moment it is 
thought to have been overcome. Sovereignty triumphs when stasis 
is presented as eliminating violence. To present the salient aspects of 
this twist, we can turn to Nietzsche, who describes it as a reversal in 
On the Genealogy of Morality. In the first essay of the Genealogy of Moral-
ity, Nietzsche outlines two forms of power in terms of the contrast 
between the nobleman and the slave. The slave exercises violence 
through renouncing power. This renunciation of power is commensu-
rate with an asceticism that retreats from experience, which makes 
it analogous to the sense of violence described earlier. Conversely, the 
power of the nobleman insists on experience, singularity, and con- 
testation, thereby resonating with stasis.23 The slave prevails because, 
according to Nietzsche, weakness or powerlessness provides him with 
a cunning that the nobleman finds impossible to combat. Understood 
in these terms, the drama that unfolds in Act II concerns how to avoid 
the cunning of weakness. How is it possible to bypass the overcoming 
of violence, which only leads to its triumph through the coupling of 
violence and weakness?
Before tackling this question, it is necessary to grasp what is at 
stake. Nietzsche explicitly states that this is not an incidental relation, 
but rather the relation that has determined the history of the Occident: 
“The two opposing values [represented by the nobleman and the slave] 
have fought a terrible battle for thousands of years on earth . . . up 
to now there has been no greater event than this battle” (2006, 1. 16). 
The historical significance of this “battle” consists in showing how the 
clash between the cunning of weakness and the agonism of stasis is 
determinative of how power is exercised. For Nietzsche, the cunning 
of weakness is the assertion of constituted power— it is the assertion 
of sovereignty. In modernity, to hold power, to express the right of the 
strongest, or to be sovereign, consists in the exercise of the cunning of 
weakness. The dramatic tension of Act II is not simply about a hero, 
but rather about the clash between two different worldviews: if stasis, 
following Solon, is constitutive of agonistic democracy, the violence of 
the cunning of weakness stands for sovereignty. How, then, can stasis 
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respond to the cunning of weakness? But the question formulated this 
way is still too broad. We need to circumscribe it further.
Let us proceed, then, by delineating more clearly the cunning of 
weakness by returning to the two senses of the “after” in the ques- 
tion “What comes after the subject?” As extrapolated above, the first 
sense of the “after” posits an individual that exists in a temporal con-
tinuum. The problem with this sense of the “after” is that the “death” 
of the subject would also affect the others who are of necessity part 
of it. Such an exclusion exhibits a death drive. As opposed to it, the 
“after” as relational stresses the subject’s participation as an affirma-
tion of its singularity. Instead of exclusion, we find here an agonistic 
engagement with the other. The question about the relation between 
these “afters” poses a complex problem that can be expressed as fol-
lows: If we are to overcome the death drive expressed as the elimi- 
nation of the subject, does not that reproduce the very structure of 
overcoming that the temporal sense of the “after” requires? If some-
thing is to come after the “after” understood in terms of temporal 
sequence, then the sense of the temporal continuum that is supposed 
to be overcome underwrites the structure of its overcoming— which 
entails that it survives in a different guise. Its weakness, signified by 
its overcoming, in fact signals its victory. More generally, signifying 
the temporal “after” as somehow inferior and expungeable, as some-
thing— a thought perhaps, or an illusion, even a concept— that can 
be killed off simply reproduces the logic of violence that it seeks to 
overcome. It signifies that the defeat of the subject, its death, is its 
supreme triumph. The possibility of a relational ontology that sides 
with stasis depends upon finding an adequate response to the cun-
ning of weakness.
Jacques Derrida offers one way of unraveling this complex rela-
tion between the two senses of the “after.” In “Ousia and Gramme,” 
Derrida considers Heidegger’s destruction of the “vulgar concept of 
time”— that is, the various determinations of time that presuppose a 
metaphysics of presence. Such a conception of time always relies on 
a sense of linearity and succession, such as in the first sense of the 
“after.” A close reading of Heidegger’s examples of such a “vulgar” 
concept of time leads Derrida to the conclusion that in fact “every text 
of metaphysics carries within itself . . . both the so- called ‘vulgar’ con-
cept of time and the resources that will be borrowed from the system 
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of metaphysics in order to criticize that concept” (1982, 60). Thus, it 
is no longer a matter of overcoming such a “vulgar” concept or of 
conducting a destruction of metaphysics more generally. Rather, it 
is a matter of recognizing that “perhaps there is no ‘vulgar concept 
of time’” (63). Derrida’s strategy, then, consists not in rejecting the 
“vulgar concept of time,” but rather in showing that the “vulgar con-
cept of time” rejects itself, so to speak. Or, differently put, the “vulgar 
concept of time” is its own condition of self- countering. This implies 
that a transition to the relational sense of the “after” requires the rec-
ognition that the temporal “after” is already contained in it. It is not a 
matter of transcending one meaning in favor of another, or of over-
coming one understanding in order to arrive at a second one. Rather, 
it is a matter of performing the necessary work that deconstructs the 
first sense of the “after”— after as temporal succession— thereby show-
ing its dependence upon the second “after”— after as an ontologico- 
political relationality.24
We can translate Derrida’s strategy in the dramatic scene of the 
relation between stasis and the cunning of weakness. Following Der-
rida’s strategy, we do not need to exclude, reject, overcome, expunge, 
eliminate, delete, or annihilate the sovereign violence that accompa-
nies the sense of the subject as an autonomous individual in the tem-
poral continuum. Rather, we need to show how the subject in fact 
presupposes stasis and its productive relationality. Differently put, 
such a strategy avoids asking “What comes after . . . ?” as if a clear 
rupture is possible, insisting instead on what is presupposed in this 
question. In this sense, what matters is what comes “before”— what is 
the cause that effects the “after” that can be linked to a “vulgar con-
cept of time” or to the death of the subject. The being with that charac-
terizes the ontologico- political constitution of agonistic democracy 
emerges then as the cause of the cunning of weakness. The corollary 
of this is that violence and the cunning of weakness are by- products 
of stasis. The agonistic conception, according to which the subject is 
always in relation with others, effects the violence that articulates itself 
as a thirst for power.
This means that it is no longer, as in Act I, a matter of a subjective 
choice between two options. The moment that the subject is posed to 
choose, sovereignty has already prevailed, since the cunning of weak-
ness translates this defeat into a triumph. Conversely, the strategy 
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according to which agonistic democracy can effect sovereignty does 
not rely on choice and a subjective decision but rather insists on the 
ineluctable necessity of the subject’s being with. The drama in Act II, 
then, consists in how to account for this necessity. Or, differently put, 
the dramatic twist in Act II asks: How can stasis respond to the cun-
ning of weakness in such a way that the response does not appear as 
a subjective choice but as necessary?
* * *
Walter Benjamin’s film actor stars in the drama of Act II too.25 The film 
actor in Benjamin’s extrapolation demonstrates, as we saw, the being 
with characteristics of a politics of participation. The relational ontol-
ogy of the film actor articulates through his use of technology as a 
means to facilitate participation. As we saw in the “paradoxical case” 
of the shot fired behind his back so that the camera can capture his 
reaction, his surprise makes the film actor confront the masses. Benja-
min even says that it is the people “who will control” the actor, in the 
sense that the participation using technological means is not an expe-
dient for the individual as an end in itself; rather, it is the means to 
create a community of participation where no single individual can 
hold power on its own. And yet, at this moment of the seeming vic-
tory of stasis, Benjamin sounds a stern warning. There can be “no 
political advantage derived,” he says, from this control of the actor by 
the masses until film production itself is liberated from capitalist con-
trol. Differently put, certain political and economic powers can usurp 
film’s potential to enhance participation and use it toward the oppo-
site purpose, namely, to manipulate the population. Or, in Benjamin’s 
words, “film capital uses the revolutionary opportunities implied by 
this control for counterrevolutionary purposes” (2002, 113). The dra-
matic tension between stasis and sovereignty emerges through the con-
trast between revolution and counterrevolution.26
Let us examine first the notion of the counterrevolution as it 
emerges in section XII of the “Work of Art” essay and its accompany-
ing note. Benjamin describes counterrevolution as the “corruption by 
which fascism is seeking to supplant the class consciousness of the 
masses” (2002, 113). In a significant footnote to this observation, Ben-
jamin contemplates the changes to parliamentary democracy precipi-
tated by the advent of new technologies: “Radio and film are changing 
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not only the function of the professional actor but, equally, the func-
tion of those who, like the politician, present themselves before the 
media.” Politicians communicate effectively through the media, thereby 
gradually supplanting the role of parliament. Benjamin continues: “The 
direction of this change is the same for the actor and for the politician, 
regardless of their different tasks. It tends towards the exhibition of 
controllable, transferable skills under certain social conditions” (128). 
The use of technology as a means does not have a predetermined out-
come. It can be used by diverse interests and for contradictory pur-
poses. The direction is the same in all cases in the sense that technology 
enhances control. It can be the control of the actor by the masses, 
thereby eliminating subjective autonomy and enhancing participation, 
as we saw earlier. But it can equally be the control of the people by 
those who have no interest whatsoever in enhancing political partici-
pation or instituting agonistic democracy. Benjamin is realistic about 
how the potential for control offered by technology articulates itself 
at the time of writing the essay, in 1936: “The champion, the star, and 
the dictator emerge as victors” (ibid.). Benjamin’s notion of the coun-
terrevolution, then, functions just like the cunning of weakness. As 
soon as subjective autonomy is defeated because film brings the actor 
into relation with the masses, that subjective autonomy is reinstated 
through the manipulation of individuals by “the champion, the star, 
and the dictator.”
Earlier in the essay Benjamin provides the rudiments of a response 
to counterrevolution and the cunning of weakness. In section VI, he 
draws a distinction between a “first” and a “second” technology and, 
in a significant note to the same section, he uses that distinction in 
order to offer his own interpretation of revolution. Importantly, the 
discussion of the two technologies is introduced as being drawn from 
a “dialectical standpoint.” Benjamin indicates two significant aspects 
of the distinction between the two technologies. First, “Whereas the 
[first technology] made the maximum possible use of human beings, 
the [second one] reduces their use to the minimum.” The first tech- 
nology is characterized by an opposition to the subject. The subject is 
here understood as separate from technology. The opposition between 
the first technology and the subject is so stark that Benjamin avers that 
the culmination of this technology is “human sacrifice.” The human 
uses means at its disposal in order to end its life. Conversely, the second 
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technology reduces the use of the subject in the sense that technology 
becomes its prosthesis. As in the example discussed earlier, the cam-
era is the means that allows the film actor to be transferred in front of 
the masses.
The second aspect of the distinction is this: “The first technology 
really sought to master nature, whereas the second aims rather at an 
interplay between nature and humanity” (Benjamin 2002, 107). The 
first technology leads to a dialectic of mastery, as, for instance, when 
the audience is manipulated by film: “In great ceremonial processions, 
giant rallies and mass sporting events, and in war, all of which are fed 
into the camera, the masses come face to face with themselves” (132). 
Benjamin is probably thinking here of the Nüremberg rallies and the 
Berlin Olympics— held in 1936, the year this version of the essay was 
written. The “masses come face to face with themselves” in the sense 
that technology forces them to create an identity, a “we.” This identity 
is essentially the same as the identity of the individual in time and 
space, but now on a large scale. This identity is formed by technology 
in order to control the masses. Conversely, the second technology is 
an interplay. The word that Benjamin uses, Zusammenspiel, can also 
be rendered more freely as interrelation, as a playing with, or even a 
being with. The second technology establishes that relation between 
the subject and its environment. But this is no longer a relation of mas-
tery but a joyous relation— one of play and cooperation. Technology, 
Benjamin points out, has a liberating potential when the human adapts 
to the use of means commensurate with the second technology (108).
At this juncture Benjamin inserts a note that provides a remark-
ably simple definition of revolution: “The aim of revolution is to accel-
erate this adaptation” (124). Given the above determination of the 
second technology, revolution for Benjamin indicates two things: first, 
the cooperation of the subject with the technological means at its dis-
posal, and, second, the use of technology to participate with the other, 
to enable a being with others. The revolution points to a dialectic that 
evades mastery because the unfolding of the relations are unpredict-
able, immanent, and contestable. Revolution is the creation of that 
space of contestability. Thus, Benjamin’s revolution appears as analo-
gous to the agonism instituted by stasis.
At this point, the problem of the cunning of weakness returns: 
counterrevolution uses modern technological means, such as film, in 
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order to revert to the first technology that seeks to control the masses. 
Does Benjamin provide an account as to how the second technology 
can respond to the threat of the counterrevolution? Even though Ben-
jamin does not formulate the problem in these terms, the example 
of the shot that surprises the actor suggests an answer. The reason is 
that the metaphysical tradition imbues surprise in a dialectic of mas-
tery. The film actor’s surprise responds by transferring control to the 
masses and thus transforming mastery into participation.
There are two well- known senses of surprise in the metaphysical 
tradition that lead to a dialectic of mastery.27 First, there is the Platonic 
and Aristotelian insistence that surprise or thaumazein is the starting 
point of philosophizing. This move equates surprise with intellectual 
curiosity, or love of wisdom (philo- sofia). As Aristotle explains in the 
second chapter of the first book of Metaphysics, thaumazein refers to the 
perplexity experienced by the subject in the face of an object calling 
for explanation (1933, 982b– 983a).28 In this sense, surprise becomes 
a precondition of knowledge, the foundational mood for science or 
episteme. The culmination of this sense of surprise is Cartesian doubt. 
As in the famous anecdote from the Mediations, Descartes wonders at 
existence in the middle of the night, only to arrive at the conclusion 
that the cogito— the subject’s capacity to know— underlies existence. 
In all these cases, we have a separation of the subject from its environ-
ment. The objects around the subject are not conceived as technologi-
cal means, but rather as something alien. This is the first characteristic 
of the first technology, as extrapolated above.
The second way of understanding surprise in the metaphysical 
tradition corresponds to mastery, as the second characteristic of the 
first technology. Surprise here arises from what cannot be amenable 
to knowledge, a wonder in the sense of a miracle. Indeed, the sub- 
stantive thauma, whose root is the verb thaumazein— the word used by 
Aristotle and Plato to signify “to wonder, to be surprised”— means 
“miracle” in New Testament Greek. The same ambiguity between sur-
prise and miracle is still present in the German word “Wunder,” lead-
ing Carl Schmitt to assert: “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous 
to the miracle in theology” (36).29 The exceptional is not something 
that simply surprises the subject. Rather, it is a surprise that arises by 
the assertion of the supreme political power, the sovereign, and more-
over it indicates the sovereign’s standing above the law. Differently 
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put, the exception is analogous to the miracle because the former asserts 
the mastery of the “God on earth”— as Hobbes calls the sovereign— 
and the latter the mastery of God himself.
We can note a discrepancy between, on the one hand, established 
uses of surprise in the tradition, and, on the other, the use of surprise 
in the “strange case” of the film actor. Specifically, Benjamin utilizes the 
topos of surprise, which is linked to mastery, but for the opposite pur-
pose, namely, to argue for the liberating potential of the second tech-
nology. This is significant because it suggests that there is no monopoly 
of a topos like surprise by a dialectic of mastery. Rather, a different 
dialectic can be conceived— one that does not resolve itself into mas-
tery. Benjamin refers to this as a dialectic at a standstill. This dialectic 
signals Benjamin’s strategy for evading the cunning of weakness.30
The first move to approach Benjamin’s dialectic at a standstill from 
the perspective of surprise consists in highlighting his use of shock as 
a figure that shows a transition from Erlebnis to Erfahrung.31 These are 
two senses of experience that point, respectively, to the first and the 
second technology. In section III of the Baudelaire essay, Benjamin 
argues that being conscious can either mean an experience (Erlebnis) 
under the control of external stimuli, which can lead to trauma because 
the subject is shocked or surprised— as was the case with World War I 
veterans; or being conscious means to register the surprises— or an 
experience (Erfahrung) “for which the exposure to shock has become 
the norm” (Benjamin 2003, 318). In Erlebnis, the subject is opposed to 
its environment, whereas in Erfahrung the environment provides the 
subjects with the means of experience. Everything that does not com-
prise the subject is, according to Erlebnis, destructive of the subject. 
In the case of Erfahrung, on the contrary, the environment retains the 
potential to be of use to the subject, even when it is full of surprises 
and shocks. This has a clear political import for Benjamin, who indi-
cates that the most important element of Erfahrung is “the close con-
nection . . . between the figure of shock and the urban masses” (320). 
Sociality, then, the being with others, can even take place as an invol-
untary reaction to shock, so long as that forms a kind of experience 
that corresponds to the second technology.
According to Benjamin, this experience of shock or surprise can 
also be intentional. Benjamin signals out here Brecht’s epic theater that 
eliminates any vestige of catharsis.32 In other words, epic theater does 
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not provide an emotional release for the subject in the guise of a reso-
lution to a dialectic. The reason is that any such resolution or release 
will introduce the cunning of weakness. Instead, Benjamin focuses 
on Brecht’s technique of freezing the drama on the stage as an unex-
pected, surprising, even shocking moment for the audience that con-
tains a didactic potential. There is a stasis on the stage, a surprising 
standstill of the action. In the first version of “What Is Epic Theatre?,” 
Benjamin coins the term “dialectic in a standstill” in describing this 
surprise in Brechtian theater, which he elaborates in the second ver-
sion as the “discovery (or defamiliarization) of situations . . . fostered 
through interruption of the action” (2003, 304). Film goes a step fur-
ther, according to the “Work of Art” essay: “Film has freed the physi-
cal shock effect” (2002, 119). With film, it is not simply a matter of the 
director or the playwright probing the audience to participate. Rather, 
with film the masses can also take control, as Benjamin points out 
earlier, in section XII. Surprise, shock, and their cognates describe a 
trajectory of the second technology that leads progressively to an inten-
sification of participation: from participation that is enabled at the per-
sonal level through Erfahrung, to the communal level in the theater, to 
a participation through film that can potentially comprise everyone 
since a film’s audience is potentially limitless. Surprise then figures in 
the second technology.
By thus subverting a topos traditionally linked to the first technol-
ogy, Benjamin’s dialectic at a standstill shifts the terms in such a way 
as to avoid the central premise of the cunning of weakness, namely, 
that either one position or the other will have to prevail— either being 
with or the death of the subject, either agonistic democracy or sov- 
ereignty, either stasis or violence, either revolution or counterrevolu-
tion. Surprise shows that this either/or can be inclusive in the sense 
that surprise describes an experience whose basis is participation and 
being with. Surprise is ultimately not a matter of choice but a nec- 
essary reaction. Benjamin’s subversion of the topos of surprise sug-
gests that what causes the surprise that separates the subject from its 
environment and leads to sovereignty is in fact a different notion of 
surprise, one that points to participation and being with. Surprise as 
first technology presupposes surprise as second technology. At the 
same time, given the presence of a counterrevolutionary notion of sur-
prise, which has historically been mobilized to animate the cunning 
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of weakness, the notion of surprise as stasis needs to be worked out. 
The film actor’s surprise does that work for Benjamin. The strategy of 
surprise in the “strange case” of the film actor agrees with the Der-
ridean strategy described earlier. Echoing Derrida, we could say that 
there is really no surprise that is individualistic and anchored in a dia-
lectic of mastery— because the dialectic of mastery presupposes stasis.
* * *
There is an enactment of this strategy we encounter in Derrida and 
Benjamin that is directly linked to Solon’s law of stasis. It emerges in 
an anecdote Plutarch relates about Solon. Even though the episode is 
placed in a time prior to Solon’s laws, and despite its almost apocry-
phal nature, it still captures the essential elements of the strategy that 
relates stasis and violence in such a way as to avoid the cunning of 
weakness and a dialectic of mastery, and it does so by showing that 
stasis is the actual cause of sovereignty.
The polis of Athens and the polis of Megara are in a prolonged 
conflict for the control of the island of Salamis. The Athenians, fed up 
by the lack of resolution, pass “a law that no one in future, on pain of 
death, should move, in writing or orally, that the city take up its con-
tention for Salamis.” This is the diametrical opposite from the law of 
stasis— the law according to which whoever does not participate in 
conflicts of the city is to be disenfranchised and expelled from the city. 
According to the Solonian law, stasis produces participation and hence 
it is absolutely indispensable for the operation of agonistic democracy. 
Democracy does not exist without stasis. Conversely, the law that pro-
hibited even raising the issue of Salamis “on pain of death” is designed 
to preempt the possibility of stasis. In this, it also excludes the possibil-
ity of participation. It functions instead as a sovereign ban, as the sov-
ereign prerogative of life and death indicated by the punishment to 
execute anyone who raises the issue of Salamis. The contrast between 
the prohibition to raise the issue of Salamis and the Solonian law about 
stasis is so sharp that it would not be inconceivable that Solon writes 
the later law precisely as a response to the law about Salamis prohibit-
ing stasis. Despite the lack of textual or historical evidence to sup- 
port a direct connection between the two laws, Plutarch reports the 
profound influence that the law about Salamis has had on Solon: 
“Solon could not endure the disgrace of this [the law about Salamis]” 
CC #96.indd   91 09/08/2017   9:58:46 PM
92 DIMITRIS VARDOULAKIS
(Plutarch, VIII.1). It is not inconceivable that Solon’s sense of “dis-
grace” prompted him later to conceive of the law of stasis.
But the implications of this sense of “disgrace” reach much further 
than being a possible prompt for the law of stasis. More important, the 
sense of disgrace foregrounds the contrast between two political dispo-
sitions. One, espoused by Solon, is agonistic— and this means an ideal 
that engages in the here and now asserting the power of participation. 
A sense of disgrace can be a motivating factor for the citizen to engage 
in stasis. The other, on the contrary, is the ideal of the perpetuation of 
Athenian power that asserts itself as the weakness to conduct a war 
for Salamis and as capital punishment for any member of the polis who 
internally challenges this sovereign assertion of weakness. Dissimu-
lating the support for an ideal of peace, the law prohibiting debate on 
the Salamis issues in fact an assertion of sovereign violence— indicated 
by “on the pain of death.” It asserts violence by rescinding power— 
that is, it mobilizes the cunning of weakness. Thus, Solon’s response to 
this law— a response that I will describe in a moment— can be under-
stood not merely as a synecdoche of the law of stasis. Moreover, it is 
an assertion of the primacy of stasis over sovereignty.
So how does the disgrace of the elimination of stasis provoke Solon 
to respond? The first step of Solon’s strategy is to spread a rumor in 
the polis that he is losing his mind, that he is showing “signs of mad-
ness” (Plutarch, VIII.2). The wording is significant, since Plutarch uses 
the word “ekstasis” to signify “madness.” The main meaning of eksta-
sis is associated with poetic frenzy, the madness of inspiration— we 
will see shortly how poetry plays a role in this story about Solon, 
which affirms this meaning of ekstasis.33 But there is, in addition, a 
play with the etymology in such a way as to inscribe Solon’s ekstasis 
into a political realm. We have the word “stasis” with the prefix “ek.” 
The prefix signifies an extension— a movement away, a thrusting out. 
It is as if Solon is losing his mind because the Salamis law thrusts him 
out of stasis. He is exiled from stasis— he is ek- static. The opposite 
of stasis is victorious— which, for Solon, is madness. But this leap 
away from stasis is also a return to stasis. Or, rather, stasis is the pre-
supposition of this ekstasis. The reason is that the ekstasis enables a 
strategy to reinstate stasis in the polis. Having spread the rumor to 
protect himself from prosecution, Solon composes satiric poems about 
the law and recites them in the agora. The poetic and subjective— 
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ontologico- political— meanings of ekstasis merge in this act: the poetic 
frenzy is an affirmation of the primacy of stasis. Solon’s intervention 
is decisive. The overwhelmingly positive response of the polis leads 
to the revoking of the Salamis law.34
Solon did not confront the Salamis law head on. He did not seek 
a revolution that would overthrow the law. In fact, a revolution whose 
aim is the overthrow of constituted power is in danger of playing into 
the hands of the cunning of weakness. The reason is that the substitu-
tion of one sovereign by another is still a perpetuation of sovereign 
violence. Solon is well aware of the cunning of weakness. His ekstasis, 
then, is not simply a tactic to undermine the law. Instead, his ekstasis 
enacts that which the law prohibits— namely, stasis and the sense of 
participation and agonistic democracy that follow from it. And yet this 
enactment does not, strictly speaking, break the law of Salamis; since 
the enactment is ekstatic, it is a madness that is performed in a poetic 
frenzy. This requires Solon to actively work, to engage and participate 
by grasping the singularity of the moment. This is a strategy that both 
responds to the situation at hand and at the same time shows a response 
evading the cunning of weakness because it shows that agonism and 
stasis are contained within sovereignty. Solon’s strategy, then, echoes 
the Derridean strategy as well as the Benjaminian dialectic at a stand-
still, which I discussed earlier.
Following Solon, we can call the strategy that evades the cun- 
ning of weakness the ekstatic strategy. The ekstatic strategy presents 
a scene in which the subject still plays a crucial role. It is a role that 
affirms singularity, participation, engagement, and the work required 
to evade the cunning of weakness. At the same time, the ekstatic strat-
egy is not the prerogative of any one subject in particular. This is a 
strategy that arises from an ontologico- political level that cannot be 
appropriated by any one subject. Rather, it is the ontologico- political 
that frames subjective actions. From this perspective, the drama enacted 
in this scene is not about one subject, such as Solon. Rather, it is about 
the relation between two ways of relating. One way is a relation that 
seeks to eliminate participation using the cunning of weakness. Accord-
ing to agonism, the second way of relating, participation is inscribed 
in all political scenes, even when participation seems to have been 
ruled out by law or by rote. This suggests that stasis is the necessity 
that determines the actions of the subject. There is no subject without 
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the imperative to engage agonistically with the other. The ekstatic strat-
egy determines that the cunning of weakness cannot prevail because 
it presupposes— it is the after- effect of— stasis.
There are three important points that can be drawn in conclu- 
sion. First, the dramatic scene about the relation between stasis and 
sovereignty resonates with contemporary thinking of democracy and 
the political. The fact that the ekstatic strategy can be discovered from 
the time of the Athenian polis up to current conceptions of the politi-
cal and the subject indicates a thread that still connects modernity 
with agonistic democracy. The radical democratic act today is to fol-
low that thread of stasis and agonism. The corollary of this is that the 
ekstatic strategy shows that the primacy of stasis— the fact that sover-
eign violence is an effect of stasis— is not peculiar to particular insti- 
tutions or to particular historical configurations. Rather, the ekstatic 
strategy is the mechanism that shows that democracy is the cause of 
the sovereignty.
Second, the expression of the ekstatic strategy in scenes of stasis is 
always singular. Even though stasis is not confined to particular in- 
stitutional or historical configurations, still its enactment is always a 
response to singular circumstances and it is always a singular response. 
Solon’s actions, for instance, are specifically adapted to the singular 
circumstances that he finds himself in when he is confronted with the 
cunning of weakness in the guise of the law about Salamis. Solon’s 
response is unique— it is singular and unrepeatable. The corollary to 
this is that the singularity of the response always runs manifold risks. 
The risk can arise either from the way that the response will be received 
by the other, or by the always present possibility of the insufficiency 
of the response. For instance, Solon has to take the risk that either the 
Athenians will react negatively to his ekstasis, or that his sense of dis-
grace in the face of the Salamis law fails to grasp the situation ade-
quately. The singularity of the enactment of stasis is inevitably pregnant 
with risk.
Third, the agonistic sense of democracy has to embrace both the 
ekstatic strategy as a way of responding to the cunning of weakness 
and the singularity of each response. This means that, on the one 
hand, stasis inscribes agonism as the opposition to the cunning of 
weakness and the kind of politics that follow from it. And on the other 
hand, it also means that every articulation of the ekstatic strategy has 
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no guarantee that it will live up to the agonistic principle. The strategy 
cannot always be successful. Ekstasis can also fail to live up to stasis. 
Maybe here we encounter the closest we can come to a definition of 
agonistic democracy: the continuous approximation and distancing 
between the strategy employed to articulate stasis and the presenta-
tion of stasis in the way that subjects relate to each other. Given that 
this is not a definition in the sense that it gives a consistent description 
of this struggle, maybe it is better to understand it as the drama or the 
dramatic scene of the political: the subject’s unstable, risky, and inces-
sant effort to participate in stasis.
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33– 57. Balibar has recently tried to review and renew the argument of this paper 
in “Can We Say: After the Subject Comes the Stranger?,” talk for the Conference 
“Thinking with Balibar,” Columbia University, Maison Française, November 13– 
14, 2014. I thank Étienne Balibar for making a copy of his address available to me.
 2. The same law is also reported elsewhere, for instance, by Plutarch in Solon, 
in Lives, vol. 1, XX.1. For a review of the various sources of the law, as well as the 
reasons why I prefer to call it the “law of stasis” as opposed to the “law of neutral-
ity,” see chap. 1 of Vardoulakis, Violence and Democracy.
 3. Cf. Elton T. E. Baker, Entering the Agon.
 4. See, in particular, Stasis Before the State and Violence and Democracy, where 
I outline a series of implications that follow the principle of the priority of kratos 
over demos in the understanding of agonistic democracy.
 5. See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War; and Plutarch, Solon, 
XXIV.2.
 6. The discourse of exceptionalism is much later and it has a specific histori-
cal grounding, namely, the political genesis of the United States. An important 
figure for this discourse is Alexis de Tocqueville’s book on America from the early 
nineteenth century, Democracy in America. For a more recent, important contribu-
tion, see Michael Walzer’s What Does It Mean to Be an “American”?
 7. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit.
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 8. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time.
 9. Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes 
Toward an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.
 10. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition.
 11. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.
 12. Gerhard Richter has written a compelling conceptual analysis of the 
“after.” See Richter, Afterness: Figures of Following in Modern Thought and Aesthetics. 
See also Peter Krapp, Déjà vu: Aberrations of Cultural Memory.
 13. As Chris Peterson points out in “The Posthumanism to Come,” this dis-
avowal of the subject can also characterize discourse such as posthumanism and 
animal studies.
 14. As Jean- Luc Nancy warns, this does not entail a “liquidation” of the sub-
ject. Nancy notes in the Introduction the following double movement: “There is 
nothing nihilistic in recognizing that the subject— the property of the self— is the 
thought that reabsorbs or exhausts all possibility of being in the world (all possi-
bility of existence, all existence as being delivered to the possible).” This identi- 
fies the subject within a particular ontological matrix of metaphysics, according to 
which the subject is defined by being referred to something over and above itself. 
But Nancy also immediately adds: “and that this same thought, never simple, never 
closed upon itself without remainder, designates and delivers an entirely different 
thought: that of the one and that of the some one, of the singular existent that the 
subject announces, promises, and at the same time conceals.” In other words, the 
conception that denies to the subject is at the same time implicated, of necessity and 
even despite itself, in not only promising and even presupposing that existence. 
Jean- Luc Nancy, Introduction, in Cadava et al., Who Comes After the Subject?, 4.
 15. I analyze the justification of violence as the definition of sovereignty in 
Sovereignty and Its Other.
 16. I have developed aspects of such a relational ontology of the subject as a 
doppelgänger elsewhere. See Dimitris Vardoulakis, The Doppelgänger: Literature’s 
Philosophy, in which I approach the question of the subject in the wake of the Kan-
tian separation between subject and subjectivity.
 17. Bonnie Honig has described a similarly constructed ambivalence around 
the figure of the foreigner as central to democracy in Democracy and the Foreigner. 
And Amanda Third shows that a similar ambivalence around the figure of the 
female terrorist is determinative both of feminism and radical politics in Gendering 
the Political: Deconstructing the Female Terrorist.
 18. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, chap. 5.
 19. For a reading of the political in Walter Benjamin’s work, see Andrew 
Benjamin, Working with Walter Benjamin: Recovering a Political Philosophy. Howard 
Caygill’s Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience remains the best account of Ben-
jamin’s conception of experience through his writings on art.
 20. For the most important contribution to Benjamin’s importance for film 
theory, see Miriam Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benja-
min, and Theodor W. Adorno.
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 21. Technology as one prosthesis of the subject and the dismantling of sub-
jective autonomy implicate each other, as Carry Wolfe argues in What Is Posthu-
manism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). This is further 
articulated in terms of a political ontology that is attuned to being with, to “the 
necessity of the other” (Wolfe, 122).
 22. Godard says: “I like to sneak up on an actor from behind, leaving him to 
fend for himself, following his groping movements in the part, trying to seize on 
the sudden, unexpected, good moment which crops up spontaneously” (7). Godard 
is here describing how neither uses improvisation nor a set script, extracting instead 
a performance from the actor on the set.
 23. For the agonistic in Nietzsche, see Christa Davis Acampora, Contesting 
Nietzsche (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013).
 24. I cannot deviate here into an excursus on Nietzsche, but I want to note 
that the same strategy can be noted in his work. For instance, in On the Genealogy 
of Morality, this strategy is particularly prominent in the third essay. Nietzsche con-
trasts throughout the Genealogy two moralities, one that is an affirmation of life and 
of the will to power, and another that is reactive and negative. One way in which 
the latter manifests itself is the ascetic ideal, which, as Nietzsche argues in the third 
essay, is best encapsulated by the priest. There is, however, a turn in Nietzsche’s 
argument, whereby he argues that the negation of life is nothing but a distorted or 
corrupted expression of the will to power: “this ascetic priest, this apparent enemy 
of life, this negating one,— he actually belongs to the really great conserving and 
yes- creating forces of life” (3.13). Understood as a strategy to counter the cunning 
of weakness, Nietzsche makes a point that is similar to Derrida’s. They both deny 
that there is an inauthentic temporality or a will to nothingness that deny singu- 
larity and the being with of humans. Rather, the vulgar conception of time and 
nihilism presupposes that singularity and hence they are not separated from it. 
This raises the question of relation. What is the relation between those modalities 
that deny singularity and affirm violence and the agonistic modalities that are life 
affirming?
 25. The dramatic tension in “Act II” between a conception of power as sov-
ereignty and a conception of power as agonistic democracy can be translated in 
the contrast between fascism and communism that structures the political aspect 
of Benjamin’s “Work of Art” essay. For an illuminating discussion about the rela-
tion between fascism and communism, see Peter Fenves, “Is There an Answer to 
the Aestheticizing of the Political?,” in Walter Benjamin and Art, 60– 72.
 26. The usual way of understanding the revolution in Walter Benjamin is in 
terms of messianic interruption. See, for instance, Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading 
Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History.” My comments on the revolution that 
concentrate here on a note in the “Work of Art” essay do not intend to contradict 
that view, as the later discussion of the notion of standstill in Benjamin suggests. 
They do intend, instead, to show the intimate link between the notion of technol-
ogy as a means or medium of experience and the revolution.
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 27. I should note that Genevieve Lloyd proposes a thoroughly different 
genealogy of surprise in Reclaiming Wonder (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2017)— one that I was not aware of when I wrote the present article.
 28. See also Plato, Theaetetus, in Theaetetus and Sophist, 155d.s.
 29. Sigrid Weigel shows that Benjamin reconfigures the notion of amazement 
in order to critique Schmitt. See Weigel, Body- and Image- Space: Re- reading Walter 
Benjamin, 159– 60.
 30. I do not have the space here to go into any detail in the issue of a dialectic 
at standstill in Benjamin. I will only point out Samuel Weber’s observation that the 
notion of the medium in Walter Benjamin— which in its generality covers all sorts 
of linguistic phenomena, including technological use— is linked to the notion of 
the dialectical image. See Weber, Benjamin’s– abilities.
 31. For an interesting discussion of the distinction between Erlebnis and Erdah-
rung, see Tim Beasley- Murray, Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin: Experience and 
Form, 52– 56.
 32. On Benjamin’s relation to Brecht, see Erdmut Wizisla, Walter Benjamin 
and Bertolt Brecht: The Story of a Friendship.
 33. For an account of the ancient Greek uses of ekstasis, see Michael A. Rinella, 
Pharmakon: Plato, Drug Culture, and Identity in Ancient Athens, 36– 40.
 34. This is probably the best- known historical anecdote about Solon’s poems, 
and as such its actual historical veracity is contestable. For a reading of Solon’s 
poem about Salamis, its contextualization in archaic poetry, and for a thorough 
bibliography, see Elizabeth Irwin, “The Transgressive Elegy of Solon?,” in Solon 
of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches, ed. Josine H. Blok and André 
P. M. H. Lardinois, 36– 78, especially 40– 44.
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